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In [2], Richard E. Grandy proposes that the distinction between mass and 
sortal terms be understood as a difference in levels of predicates. Mass 
terms - like 'gold' and 'water' - are first-level predicates; sortal terms - like 
'ring' and 'statue' - are second-level predicates. A natural language with 
terms of both sorts is to be regarded as a kind of second-order language, 
with quantifiers appearing at (at least) two levels. 
Mass terms apply to stuff; sortal terms apply to things. First-level vari- 
ables range over s tuf f -  or quantities of stuff; second-level variables (first- 
level predicate variables) range over things. 
Grandy proposes to analyze things as relations between quantities of 
stuff and points in time, subject to the condition that each such relation 
associates at most one quantity of stuff with each temporal point. The idea 
is that things are best thought of as functions - not always defined- from 
times to quantities of stuff. Thus a gold ring is identified with the function 
whose values are the quantities of gold that constitute the ring from mold- 
ing to melting. Moreover, the spatial location of a thing is determined by 
the spatial location of the stuff that constitutes it; so the spatial location of 
the ring at any moment is the spatial location of its gold. 
In this way, a difference emerges between the sentences 'There is gold on 
the table' and 'There is a ring on the table'. The first has the simple form 
(1) 3x ^ o(x,  now)), 
where G and 0 are first-level predicates for 'gold' and 'on the table', and x 
is a first-level variable ranging over quantities of stuff. The second sentence, 
however, is cast something like 
(2) 3R(~R(R) ^ 3x(R(x ,  now) ^ O(x, now))), 
where ~R is a second-level predicate for 'ring' and R is a first-level predicate 
variable ranging over thing(-relation)s, appearing once in subject position 
and once in predicate position. 
By rendering mass and sortal terms distinctly in this way, Grandy is able 
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to resolve some familiar puzzles. How can we affirm 'The ring is the gold 
which was on the table' and 'The ring is new' without implying that the gold 
which was on the table is also new? The answer, essentially, is that the 
expression 'the ring' is ambiguous. The sentence 'The ring is the gold which 
was on the table' is of the form 
(3) ~x3R(9~(R) ^ R(x, now)) = ~x(G(x) ^ O(x, then)). 
Here 'the ring' means the quantity of stuffthat currently constitutes a r ing-  
as in the description ~x3R(~(R)^ R(x, now)). The sentence 'The ring is 
new', on the other hand, comes out as 
(4) ~r(~R~x(9~(R) ^ R(x, now))), 
where uf" is a second-level predicate for 'new'. In this case, 'the ring' refers 
to the thing itself, and not to the stuff of which it is constituted - as in the 
description ~R3x(~(R) ^ R(x, now)). Clearly, there is no inference from (3) 
and (4) to 
(5) N (~x(G(x) ^ O(x, then))) 
- 'The gold which was on the table is new' - in which 'new' appears as a 
first-level predicate, N. 
I agree with Grandy that both mass and sortal terms are best treated as 
predicates, but I do not share his conviction that they are predicates of  
different levels. Not  that I believe them to be on the same level; it is just that 
I see little to prompt the alternative opinion. Given Grandy's views on the 
nature of  the entities involved, the sentence 'There is a ring on the table' 
could as well be cast as 
(6) 3r(k(r) ^ 3x((x, now) r ^ O(x, now))), 
where R here is a first-level predicate - unquantified - for 'ring' and r is a 
first-level variable (perhaps with its range restricted to things). 
The point is that nothing in the metaphysics of  Grandy's proposal re- 
quires second-order predication and quantification, as he remarks himself. 
Nevertheless, he argues that higher-order logic is already essential to the 
representation of sortal predicates like 'bit of  gold', in which 'bit of '  
appears to apply syntactically to a mass term to produce a sortal. However, 
while one might agree about the ut i l i ty-  even the necessity- of  representing 
'bit of  gold' as ~(G) ,  where ~ is a predicate-forming operator correspond- 
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ing to 'bit of', Grandy lacks an independent argument to show that M(G) 
is second-level rather than first-level. (It only confuses the matter - and 
perhaps begs the question - to call M a "constant relation expression".) 
Grandy does note what seems to be a "systematic difference" in the gram- 
mars of the two sorts of term. But I fail to see how this entails a difference 
of level. 
Indeed, there may be a reason for preferring a uniformly first-order 
approach. There are predicates, like 'new', that apply equally to both stuff 
and things. Granted, the newness of the ring may have nothing to do with 
the newness of the gold that constitutes it - the gold may well be old. But 
'new' is anyhow applicable to both the ring and the gold. Thus on Grandy's 
analysis not only do expressions like 'the ring' turn out to be ambiguous, 
so also do certain predicates. These must be represented - as in (4) and 
(5) - by predicates of different levels, and while there may be no logical 
objection to the appearance of such duplicates, it will nevertheless be in- 
cumbent upon the semantic theory for such a language to account for the 
connection in meaning between them. 
Let me conclude my remarks on the linguistic aspect of Grandy's 
proposals with the observation that - whichever syntactic analysis be 
chosen- a great deal of theory must be attributed to any language contain- 
ing both mass and sortal terms. For, as already noted, corresponding to 
every thing-relation covered by a predicate there needs to be a statement to 
the effect that the relation is many-one. And Grandy indicates further 
axioms - for example, that to say that a thing is a ring is to say that it is 
sometimes instantiated. It is not clear, however, where such theoretical 
constraints are to appear. As axioms in the object language? As part of the 
metatheory? More needs to be understood of Grandy's conception of 
semantics for natural languages. 
Now I turn to the metaphysical aspect of Grandy's paper. 
Responding to the objection that his analysis obliterates the concrete- 
abstract distinction - the objection that things (anyway, physical objects) 
are concrete whereas relations are abstract-  Grandy asserts that what sort 
of thing something is should be accounted for in terms of the best semantic 
theory for a language containing words for things of that sort: "Whatever 
that semantics [for English'] associates with 'table' is what 'table' refers to 
in English." This reply is meager enough, of course, in the absence of any 
substantive account of how a semantic theory for a natural language might 
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interpret sentences with mass and sortal terms in the way Grandy ad- 
vocates. But, regardless of how well his theory of stuff and things meshes 
with this-or-that semantic theory for this-or-that natural language, it is 
clear that Grundy is offering a theory-  what may be called a formalization 
of certain notions implicit in discourse containing mass and sortal terms. 
It is sometimes said that sortal terms differ from mass terms in that sortal 
terms "divide their reference" whereas mass terms do not. According to 
Grandy, mass terms do, after all, divide their reference; they divide it 
among quantities of stuff. What is a quantity of s tuff-  of gold, for instance ? 
Grandy declares the notion to be a technical one, akin to but not the same 
as that discussed by Cartwright in [1]. For Grundy, "it  suffices that a 
quantity be spatio-temporally coherent and consist uniformly of the same 
type of stuff." He says further that "[a]  quantity of gold.., contains many 
other quantities of gold." 
This last remark causes some perplexity. I f  a quantity of gold is indeed 
divisible into further quantities of gold, then although sentence (1) - 'There 
is gold on the table' - is intelligible enough, I do not know how to construe 
a sentence like 
(7) 3!x(G(x) ^ O(x, then)) 
- 'There was exactly one quantity of gold on the table'. The point is not 
that (7) is false or that it is necessarily false. Rather, the idea that quantities 
are divisible in this way simply calls into question the very meaningfulness 
of quantification and identity in connection with mass terms and quantities 
of stuff. 
The question raised here is important for Grandy. For he regards it as 
an attractive feature of his analysis that good sense can be made of sentences 
like (3) - 'The ring is the gold which was on the table'. But (3) seems likely 
always to be false, or meaningless, inasmuch as it implies (7). 
The sensible thing might seem to be to give up the idea of divisibility. 
Still, sentences like (7) - and hence (3) - are puzzling. Any good-sized 
quantity of gold will contain other quantities of gold. But how many? 
Does it make sense to ask? Questions like this require resolution before 
quantity and quantification can be used successfully to explain the be- 
havior of mass and sortal terms. 
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N O T E  
* The present paper revises one I read as a reply to an earlier version of Richard E. 
Grandy's 'Stuff and Things' at the seventieth annual meeting of the American Philo- 
sophical Association, Eastern Division, in Atlanta, 27 December 1973. I thank Duane 
T. Williams for helpful criticism of this and my previous efforts. 
